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IN RE SILICON GRAPHICS INC.: 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS 
RESULTING FROM THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVATE 
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM 
ACT'S PLEADING STANDARD 
MARILYNF. JOHNSON 
KAREN K. NELSON 
& A.C. PRITCHARD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article presents an empirical study of changes in shareholder 
wealth resulting from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in In re 
Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 1 which interpreted the pleading 
provision established in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
* University of Michigan Business School, Stanford University Graduate School of Business, 
and University of Michigan Law School, respectively. We appreciate the helpful comments of Merritt 
Fox, Ellen Katz, Joan Larsen, Ronald Mann, and Mark West, as well as those by participants at a 
Fawley Lunch at the University of Michigan Law School and at a workshop sponsored by the Center 
for Corporate Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Johnson acknowledges the support of 
Ernst & Young, L.L.P. Nelson acknowledges the support of the Financial Research Initiative at the 
Stanford Graduate School of Business. Pritchard acknowledges the support of the Cook Fund at the 
University of Michigan Law School. In the interest of full disclosure, Pritchard was previously Senior 
Counsel at the Securities and Exchange Commission and in that capacity wrote the Commission's 
arnicus brief in Silicon Graphics. The views expressed here, however, are those of the authors alone 
and do not represent the views of the Commission or its staff. 
I. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). The case was a 
securities fraud class action brought by shareholders who claimed misstatements about company 
performance inflated the value of the company's stock and that corporate insiders profited from the 
inflated price through insider trading. The court dismissed the claims based on the rigorous standard it 
adopted. See id. at 980. 
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1995 (the "Reform Act").2 Congress passed the Reform Act as part of an 
ongoing effort to protect corporations from abusive suits alleging "fraud by 
hindsight."3 In such suits, plaintiffs claimed that a sudden drop in a 
company's stock price was evidence that the issuer and its management 
covered up the bad news that led to the price drop. The Reform Act 
discourages such suits by requiring complaints alleging fraud to "state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.'>4 Courts have interpreted the Reform 
Act's pleading standard in diverse ways.5 The Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation in Silicon Graphics is the most stringent, requiring plaintiffs 
to allege facts that would show the defendants were "deliberately reckless" 
in making the misrepresentation that gave rise to the fraud claim.6 This 
pleading standard allows courts to dismiss fraud suits at an early stage if 
the court deems they lack merit, but it also increases the risk courts will 
dismiss meritorious suits as well. 
In this Article, we examine the effects of the stringent Silicon 
Graphics standard using event study methodology to provide empirical 
evidence regarding investors' perception of the Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation of the pleading standard. Event study methodology 
previously has been used to assess the effect of state corporate law on 
shareholder wealth.7 Our study differs from that prior work because it tests 
the market reaction to a decision before the United States Supreme Court 
has conclusively decided the question. Given the clear split in the circuit 
courts over the interpretation of the pleading standard, the Supreme Court 
is likely to eventually grant certiorari to resolve the issue. In the face of 
textual ambiguity in the statute and confusion in the legislative history, 
shareholder wealth provides one potential normative criterion the Supreme 
Court could consider to determine the "correct" interpretation of the 
Reform Act's pleading standard. In this case, social science has the 
potential to directly influence the path of the law.8 
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)4(b)(I) & (2) (West 1999). 
3. Congress recently passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, see id., in an 
effort to prevent such suits from being filed in state court See generally David M. Levine & Adam C. 
Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Unifonn Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue 
Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1 (1998). 
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u4(b)(2). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 55-64. 
6. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Lltig., 183 F.3d at 974. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89. 
8. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) 
(predicting the influence of statistics and economics on the direction of law). Our study also responds 
to Judge Posner's criticism that "so much legal scholarship and judicial analysis is unoriginal, 
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We recognize that the use of wealth maximization as a normative 
criterion for judicial decisionmaking is controversial.9 But wealth 
maximization for shareholders may be more acceptable as an appropriate 
norm in the context of securities laws because investors unquestionably 
purchase securities in an effort to increase their wealth. In particular, we 
believe shareholder wealth provides the appropriate baseline for 
interpreting the Reform Act because it best serves Congress' purposes in 
adopting the law, and it best reflects the interests of investors, who are the 
principal beneficiaries of the securities laws.10 At a minimum, courts 
should consider the effect that securities law decisions have on shareholder 
wealth when empirical evidence is available, as it is here, and Congress has 
not clearly expressed a contrary intent. 
Two competing hypotheses may explain the effect of Silicon 
Graphics' rigorous pleading standard on shareholder wealth: (1) the high 
standard primarily discourages suits that, regardless of their merits, are not 
cost-justified in terms of deterring fraud, thereby enhancing shareholder 
wealth on average; or (2) the high standard chills suits that are both 
meritorious and cost-justified in addition to non-cost justified suits, thus 
undermining deterrence and diminishing shareholder wealth. To determine 
the effect of the Silicon Graphics decision on the wealth of shareholders, 
we look at the stock prices of a sample of high technology companies from 
the computer hardware, computer software, and pharmaceutical industries, 
and a sub-sample of those companies headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. A 
positive stock price reaction would support the first hypothesis, while a 
negative reaction would support the second. 
The Silicon Graphics decision has implications beyond the law of any 
particular circuit. It offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the wealth 
effects of the varying interpretations of the Reform Act's pleading standard 
for three reasons. First, the Silicon Graphics "deliberate recklessness" 
standard for pleading scienter is generally regarded as the most difficult 
interpretation for plaintiffs to satisfy. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and other critics of the "deliberate recklessness" standard have 
warned that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation will harm investors because it 
unempirical, conventional, and unworldly, overwhelmingly verbal and argumentative (indeed, verbose 
and polemical}, narrowly focused on doctrinal questions, mesmerized by the latest Supreme Court 
decisions, and preoccupied with minute and ephemeral distinctions-rather than bold, scientific, and 
descriptive." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 468 ( 1990). 
9. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 374-87 (discussing the use of wealth maximization in legal 
decisionmaking). See id. at 374 n.23 (collecting articles criticizing wealth maximization as a normative 
criterion). 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17. 
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will discourage the filing of meritorious suits.11 Since the plaintiff cannot 
use discovery to determine what the defendants knew when they were 
making the allegedly fraudulent statements, the case will be dismissed 
unless the defendant can find evidence in public sources of the defendants' 
fraudulent intent.12 If cases of genuine fraud were dismissed or never filed, 
deterrence would be undermined. 
Second, the decision was unexpected. Given that the Ninth Circuit 
previously had the least stringent requirements for pleading fraud, its 
decision to adopt the most stringent interpretation under the Reform Act 
caught many securities lawyers by surprise.13 Accordingly, the decision 
was unlikely to have been anticipated by stock market participants and 
reflected in stock prices prior to its announcement.14 Finally, the Ninth 
Circuit encompasses Silicon Valley, so the Silicon Graphics decision 
governs a substantial number of companies commonly targeted by 
attorneys bringing securities fraud class actions.15 Thus, the decision is 
likely to be of economic significance. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the economics of 
securities fraud, the role of class actions in deterring that fraud, and why 
11. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on Securities Litigation Abuses Concerning S. 1260, Tile 
Securities Litigation Unifonn Standards Aci of 1997, Before the Sub comm. on Sec. of tile Senate Comm. 
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, I 05th Cong. 13 (1997) ("A unifonn federal standard that did not 
include recklessness as a basis for liability would jeopardize the integrity of the securities markets, and 
would deal a crippling blow to defrauded investors with meritorious claims.") (statement of the SEC). 
12. See Elliot J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve tile Procedural 
Catch-22 that tile Private Securities Litigation RefonnAct Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457 (1998). See 
also Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of tire Effect of tile 
PSLRA's Jntemal-lnfonnation Standard on '33 and '34 Act Clai111S, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998). 
Plaintiffs will not have access to discovery because of the Refonn Act's discovery stay, which bars 
discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(8) (West 1999). 
13. See, e.g., Patrick J. Coughlin, Ninth Circuit Panel's Opinion in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. 
Conflicts With Other Circuits, 1136 P.L.lJCorp. 81 (Sept.-Oct. 1999) (plaintiffs' lawyer bemoaning 
court's "surprising holding''). 
14. See Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White,..Qf Econometrics and lndetenninacy: A Study of 
Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551, 569 (1987) (market is less 
likely to have anticipated judicial decision "where a decision appeared to depart from or reverse well-
established authority"). See also Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of tile Takeover Statutes, 73 
VA. L. REV. 111, 182 (1987) (discussing importance of identifying correct announcement date for a 
particular legal change). The prior decisions of the Second and Third Circuits, which adopted the 
existing Second Circuit tests, were likely anticipated by stock market participants and were therefore 
unlikely to have produced a stock price reaction. 
15. Section 27 of the Exchange Act allows plaintiffs to bring suit in any district "wherein any act 
or transaction eonstituting the violation occurred" or "in the district wherein the defendant is found or is 
an inhabitant or transacts business." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West 1999). While this may allow plaintiffs 
to sue the issuer in a number of districts, plaintiffs are likely to bring suit in the district in which the 
company is headquartered in order to name the individual defendants, such as the officers and directors. 
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the effectiveness of that deterrent should be reflected in the price of 
securities. Part ill provides background on the legislative history of the 
Reform Act's "strong inference" pleading standard and explains how that 
legislative history has created a dispute over the proper interpretation of 
that standard. 
Part IV describes the sample data and presents our findings. We find 
that the interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard adopted in 
Silicon Graphics produced positive abnormal stock returns for a sample of 
high technology companies, particularly those headquartered in the Ninth 
Circuit. We also find that this stock price reaction is more positive for 
firms with a higher probability of being sued in a securities fraud class 
action, but that this positive effect diminishes as the probability of being 
sued for committing fraud increases. We conclude in Part V with some 
observations on the use of event studies in statutory interpretation and, 
specifically, on the use of shareholder wealth maximization as a normative 
guide to the interpretation of the Reform Act. 
II. SECURITIES FRAUD, CLASS ACTIONS, AND 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
An analysis of the effects of the Reform Act's pleading standard on 
shareholder wealth requires a balancing of the benefits from deterring 
securities fraud through class actions against the costs of such suits. 
Securities fraud class actions are a beneficial enforcement device only if 
the deterrence they produce is greater than the deadweight losses they 
impose. In this Part, we analyze the costs of securities fraud, as well as the 
benefits and costs of using class actions to deter that fraud. 
The leading securities law treatise states, "[t]here is no science yet 
known for quantifying the dollar value of fraud avoided; so in a sense, 
policy judgments in this area are based on often widely varying guesses as 
to whether increased fraud avoidance can be justified."16 We disagree with 
the premise that the "dollar value of fraud avoided" cannot be quantified 
and we believe policymakers can do better than "guess" when making 
policy in this area. The presence of fraud has the potential to seriously 
depress stock prices by impairing managerial accountability, distorting 
capital allocation, and reducing liquidity. Insofar as securities fraud class 
actions provide an efficient enforcement device, stock prices generally 
should reflect the effectiveness of those suits in deterring fraud. 
16. LoUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 701 (3d ed. Supp. 1999). 
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A. COSTS FROM SECURITIES FRAUD 
The typical securities fraud class action involves an alleged 
misrepresentation regarding the company's operations, financial 
performance, or future prospects that inflates the price of the company's 
stock in secondary trading markets.17 Left unchecked, misrepresentations 
by company managers potentially have a number of negative effects on the 
company's stock price. First, misrepresentations may impair the ability of 
outside shareholders to monitor the firm's performance and, more 
specifically, the performance of the firm's managers. Insofar as fraud on 
the market makes it more difficult to scrutinize managerial performance, it 
also may significantly impact the market for corporate control. Is Deterring 
misrepresentations therefore may enhance monitoring of managers, which 
may increase corporate profitability by reducing agency costs. Enhanced 
monitoring through more accurate disclosure should be reflected in higher 
share prices. 
Fraud may also affect investors' resource allocation decisions. Fraud 
harms capital allocation by enabling firms to raise money for investment 
projects that are not cost-justified. Firms that issue securities tend to have 
more forthcoming disclosure policies. I9 Insofar as those disclosures are 
fraudulent, investors will pay an inflated price for those securities. 
Managers who fraudulently inflate their stock price may be able to invest in 
projects that are not cost-justified, instead of paying cash flows to 
shareholders in the form of dividends.20 Alternatively, managers may use 
fraud to keep the firm in business when its assets should be reallocated 
through the bankruptcy process. Capital markets infected by fraud will 
raise firms' cost of capital, which, again, should be reflected in lower stock 
prices. 
Most cases alleging fraud on secondary trading markets, however, are 
not based on the fraud's effect on capital allocation: Firms are selling 
I 7. A smaller number of securities class actions involve a misrepresentation made in connection 
with an offering of securities by the company. Section 11 of the Securities Act makes issuers strictly 
liable for misstatements in a registration statement for a public offering. See IS U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 
1999). 
18. See Merritt B. Fox, Rethinking Disclosure liability in the Modem Era, 15 WASH. U. L.Q. 
903, 909 (I997) (discussing the role of accurate stock prices in facilitating market for corporate 
control). 
19. See Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determinants of A11alyst Ratings of 
Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. ACCT. REs. 246, 266 (1993) (finding statistically significant increase in 
analysts' disclosure ratings for firms during periods of securities issuance). 
20. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate 
Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2545-50 (I997). 
2000] SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS 779 
securities in only a fraction of cases. Fraud on the market cases differ from 
typical fraud cases in that the wealth transfers overwhelmingly occur 
between equally innocent investors. For every shareholder who bought at a 
fraudulently-inflated price, another shareholder has sold: The buyer's 
individual loss is offset by the seller's gain. Assuming all traders are 
ignorant of the fraud, over time they will come out winners as often as 
losers from fraudulently-distorted prices.21 In the classic case of fraud, by 
contrast, the people committing the fraud, not an innocent bystander, 
directly benefit from the fraud by transferring wealth from the victim to 
themselves. While the victim suffers an individual cost, the social cost of 
the transfer is zero because the trader committing the fraud receives an 
offsetting benefit. The social cost of fraud is not in the wealth transfer it 
effects, but rather in the responses by individuals to that potential wealth 
transfer. The wealth transfer induces the fraudulent trader to spend real 
resources in executing the fraud, and potential victims to spend real 
resources to avoid being victimized.22 Requiring traders who commit fraud 
to compensate the victim discourages both the trader from investing in 
fraud and the victim from incurring socially wasteful precaution costs 
against fraud.23 
But in the typical fraud on the market case, the corporation has not 
been trading in its own securities. Consequently, the corporation has not 
transferred wealth to itself and, therefore, has no incentive to spend real 
resources in executing the fraud. In theory, shareholders should have no 
expected loss from fraud on the market if the fraud is perfectly concealed 
until disclosure, so they would have no incentive to take precautions 
against the fraud. Thus, fraud on the market should not create the usual 
distorting effects of fraud. 
But fraud is difficult to conceal completely. Fraud on the market, left 
unchecked, will induce some investors to try to beat the market by 
investigating the statements made by the company. Informed traders, who 
are already expending substantial resources to evaluate a company's stock 
21. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 639, 646 (1996). "At least active traders with large diversified portfolios have roughly the 
same chance of being winners as losers from securities fraud, and over time these gains and losses will 
tend to net out toward zero even in the absence oflitigation." Id. 
22. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 
VA. L. REV. 623, 630 (1992) "If fraud is not deterred, market participants will take expensive 
precautions to uncover fraud so as to avoid entering into bargains they would not have concluded in an 
honest market." Id. 
23. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATELAW321 (1991). 
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price, are likely to reallocate some of their efforts from investigation to 
verification in the presence of fraud on the market. Company insiders will 
know of the fraud because of their role in its commission.24 Fraud on the 
market, therefore, may create information asymmetries between traders that 
would not otherwise exist. These information asymmetries mean potential 
profits for informed traders and corresponding losses for the uninformed.25 
To avoid these trading losses, uninformed traders would prefer to 
trade only with other uninformed traders. Because securities markets are 
largely anonymous, however, outsiders have no way of knowing when they 
are trading with a counter-party possessing superior information. They do 
know, however, that they will systematically lose when trading with the 
better informed.26 Market makers who supply liquidity to the markets on 
an uninformed basis will increase their spreads to reflect the possibility of 
dealing with traders who have superior information.27 In addition, 
uninformed shareholders will discount the amount they are willing to pay 
for shares by their expected losses from trading with the informed.28 They 
may also attempt to avoid these trading losses by trading less frequently. If 
uninformed investors trade less frequently, a greater proportion of trading 
volume will be made up of informed traders, creating an adverse selection 
problem as more uninformed traders exit the market to avoid trading with 
the better informed.29 Less trading means less liquidity, and less liquid 
securities markets create higher execution costs for trades.30 Thus, one of 
the principal social costs of fraud on the market is the increased cost of 
24. See Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements and 
Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 73 Acer. REV. 131 (1998) (finding that in the presence of 
fraud, insiders reduce their holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity). 
25. See generally Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and 
Consequences of Eamings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the 
SEC, 13 CONTEMP. Acer. REs. 1 (1996) (reporting that short selling begins to increase two months 
before the announcement of earnings manipulation). 
26. See Michael Manove, The Hann from Insider Trading and lnfonned Speculatio11, 104 Q.J. 
EcON. 823, 826 (1989) ("Insider traders buy at the right time and sell at the right time .... [l]t follows 
that on the average, outsider traders are being induced to do the opposite."). 
27. See MERTON H. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET VOLATILITY 157 (1991) 
(discussing wider spreads and reduced liquidity caused by informed trading). 
28. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 325 (arguing that shareholders will pay less for 
stock when insider trading is expected). 
29. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a 
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously lnfonned Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 74 (1985) (describing 
adverse selection problem created by the presence of informed traders). 
30. See Dechow et al., supra note 25, at 29 (reporting that bid/ask spreads increase by .7% of the 
company's stock price after announcement that company has engaged in earnings manipulation). 
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trading securities.31 This higher liquidity cost will also be reflected in 
lower stock prices.32 
In sum, investors should value devices that reduce the incidence of 
fraud. Evidence for this claim can be found in the practice of providing 
financial statements audited by reputable accounting firms and governance 
devices like audit committees of outside directors to provide independent 
oversight of company disclosures. Shareholders should also value external 
monitoring devices that deter fraud, including SEC enforcement and 
criminal prosecution of fraudsters.33 Class actions also have the potential 
to deter fraud. The effectiveness of all of these devices can be measured by 
their impact on shareholder wealth. We discuss the factors that may 
undermine the cost effectiveness of class actions in the next section. 
B. BENEHTS AND COSTS OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 
Class actions are a central component of the federal securities laws' 
anti-fraud regime. The SEC considers private class actions a "necessary 
supplement" to its own efforts in policing fraud.34 In fraud on the market 
class actions, plaintiffs' attorneys sue the corporation and its officers under 
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.35 The plaintiffs are classes of 
investors who have paid too much for their shares or (less frequently) sold 
their shares for too little because of price distortion caused by the 
misstatements. 
In the typical case, the corporation being sued neither bought nor sold 
its securities and, accordingly, did not gain from the fraud. Nonetheless, 
fraud on the market suits allow investors to recover their losses from the 
corporation based on its managers' misstatements. Given the trading 
volume in secondary markets, the potential recoverable damages in such 
suits can be a substantial percentage of the corporation's total 
capitalization, easily reaching hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, class 
actions are a potential punitive sanction that should provide a substantial 
deterrent to fraud. 
31. See Charles M. C. Lee, Market Integration and Price Execution for NYSE-Listed Securities, 
48 J. FIN. 1009, 1014 (1993). The loss ofuninfonned traders may lead to greater quoted spreads and 
higher liquidity costs. See id. 
32. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading 
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1429 (1996). 
33. Other devices may be available, including regulation by the securities exchanges. See A.C. 
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities 
Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999). 
34. Lamp v. Gilbertson, 501U.S.350, 376 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2000). 
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The effectiveness of that deterrence will be determined by how closely 
class action suits correlate with the actual incidence of fraud. Congress 
passed the Reform Act because it believed that the targeting of class 
actions was not very precise. Plaintiffs' lawyers were filing suits "citing a 
laundry list of cookie-cutter complaints" against companies "within hours 
or days" of a substantial drop in the company's stock price.36 Moreover, 
plaintiffs' lawyers had incentives to "file frivolous lawsuits in order to 
conduct discovery in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim not alleged in 
the complaint."37 
Sorting fraud from mere business reversals is difficult. The external 
observer may not know whether a drop in a company's stock price is due to 
a prior misstatement about its prospects-fraud-or a result of risky 
business decisions that did not pan out-bad luck. Unable to distinguish 
the two, plaintiffs' lawyers are forced to rely on the limited publicly 
available objective indicia when deciding to sue.38 Thus, a substantial drop 
in stock price following previous optimistic statements may well lead to a 
lawsuit. 
The scienter standard establishes the defendants' requisite knowledge 
of falsity at the time of the misstatement and is the primary means by 
which courts sort fraud from non-fraud. But the standard is notoriously 
amorphous. It is somewhat more stringent than negligence, but even in 
theory it is difficult to say how much more, and it is nearly impossible in 
practice.39 Knowingly false statements and unfortunate business decisions 
both create a risk of liability and, thus, provide a basis for filing suit. An 
uncertain standard for liability therefore makes filing a diverse portfolio of 
cases a reasonable strategy for plaintiffs' lawyers. 
Filing numerous cases is profitable for plaintiffs' attorneys because of 
the incentives that defendants face. If plaintiffs can withstand a motion to 
36. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 16 (1995). Compare Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits 
Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (arguing that 
settlement values are unrelated to strength of case), with Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994) (arguing settlement values are related to strength). 
37. s. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995). 
38. See Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider Stock Sales in Rule IOb-5 Corporate Disclosure 
Cases: Separating the Innocent from the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 97, 111 (1994): 
Id. 
Many plaintiffs' attorneys look for a convergence of three factors in determining whether 
there is a good securities fraud case: (l) optimistic statements by management; (2) a 
subsequent disclosure of "bad news" about the prospects of the company that causes a sharp 
stock price drop; and (3) stock sales by insider during the time management made the 
allegedly misleading optimistic statements. 
39. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 650 (arguing that the line between negligence and intent in 
securities fraud has become blurred). 
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dismiss, defendants generally will find settlement cheaper than litigation. 
Any case plausible on the pleadings will have a positive settlement value if 
only to avoid the costs of discovery and attorneys' fees, which can be 
substantial in these cases.40 Securities fraud class actions are expensive to 
litigate because the most common fighting issue will be scienter. The most 
helpful source for uncovering this fact will be the documents in the 
company's possession.41 Producing all documents relevant to the 
knowledge of senior executives over many months or even years can be a 
massive undertaking.42 Having produced the documents, the company can 
then anticipate a seemingly endless series of depositions, as plaintiffs' 
counsel seeks to determine whether the executives' recollections square 
with the documents.43 The cost in lost productivity may dwarf the expense 
of attorneys' fees and other direct litigation costs.44 
Beyond the cost in executives' time, the mere existence of the class 
action may disrupt relationships with suppliers and customers, who may be 
somewhat leery of dealing with a party accused of fraud.45 The Supreme 
Court has recognized that securities fraud suits pose "the threat of extensive 
discovery and disruption of normal business activities.'746 Ignoring the 
costs of litigation, the enormous potential damages also make settlement an 
attractive option for the company, even when it seems that the prospects of 
prevailing are good.47 Thus, defendants' inclination to settle gives 
plaintiffs' lawyers an incentive to file even weak cases. 
40. See Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Constance E. Bagley, Great Expectations: Risk Management 
Through Risk Disclosure, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 155, 156 (1994) (describing corporation's costs of 
responding to securities class action). 
41. See Sherrie R. Savett. The Merits Matter Most and Observations on a Changing Landscape 
Under the Private Securities litigation Reform Act of 1995, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 526 (1997). 
42 See John F. Olson, David C. Mahaffey & Brian E. Casey, Pleading Reform, Plaintiff 
Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 Bus. LAW. 1101, 1112-13 (1996) 
(describing discovery request to which defendant corporation produced 1,500 boxes of documents). 
43. See Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE LJ. 2053, 
2086-87 ( 1995). 
44. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
I995: Rebalancing litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 
51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1027-28 (1996) ("Officers, directors, and employees of companies are sidetracked 
from focusing on their core activities. Corporate officials must spend untold hours in a variety of 
litigation exercises that otherwise could be devoted to productive uses."). 
45. See id. at 1028 (describing collateral costs to corporation's business from being a securities 
fraud defendant). 
46. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975). 
47. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1487, 1511 (1996) ("The class-based compensatory damages regime in theory imposes remedies 
that are so catastrophically large that defendants are unwilling to go to trial even if they believe the 
chance of being found liable is small."). 
784 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:773 
The settlement dynamic in securities class actions reduces the 
deterrent value of such suits. The cost of litigating securities class actions 
and the potential for enormous judgments mean that even weak cases may 
produce a settlement if they are not dismissed before trial.48 Congress 
believed the difficulty in assessing the merits of a lawsuit by looking at the 
complaint allowed a substantial number of weak cases to make it through 
to settlement.49 Thus, settlements may do a poor job of sorting strong 
claims of fraud from non-fraudulent statements that were proved wrong 
only in hindsight.so If both weak and strong cases lead to settlements, the 
deterrent effect of class actions will be diluted because both innocent and 
wrongful conduct will lead to sanctions.SI Worse yet, finns have 
incentives to commit fraud to conceal poor performance if poor results can 
lead to a securities fraud class action. If that happens, imprecise deterrence 
is worse than no deterrence at all. 
III. THE REFORM ACT'S PLEADING STANDARD 
Congress attempted to improve the screening process for securities 
class actions when it enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 
The Reform Act adopted a series of procedural obstacles to securities fraud 
class actions designed to weed out nonmeritorious actions at an early stage. 
Early dismissal greatly reduces the expense to corporations forced to 
defend such suits, thereby limiting the settlement value of weak cases. 
The pleading standard established by the Reform Act gives the judge a 
more significant role in deciding the merits of the lawsuit than is typical 
48. On the subject of incentives to bring nonmeritorious cases, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing 
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 448 (1988); Avery Katz, The Effect of 
Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, IO INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 3, 14 (1990); D. 
Rosenberg & S. Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. 
L. & EcON. 3, 9-10 (1985). 
49. See H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 17 (1995). 
50. The percentage of securities fraud suits settling for nuisance value testifies to the weakness of 
judicial procedures as a screening device. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 727, 742-43 (1995) (reporting results of studies finding that between 22% to 60% of securities 
suits are settled for nuisance value); Willard T. Carleton, Michael S. Weisbach & Elliott J. Weiss, 
Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptil>e Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 511 (1996) (finding 
"smaller settlements/damages ratios [defined as roughly equivalent to the defendants' costs in 
defending the suit] for cases in which settlements were less than $2 million, which is consistent with the 
presence of nuisance suits settled on the basis of plaintiffs' attorney's expenses rather than on the 
economic damages suffered by plaintiffs"). 
51. See I.P.L. Png, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error, 6 INT'L 
REV. L. &EcoN. 101, IOI (1986) ("[T]o the extent that an individual who has not violated the law will 
be made to pay damages, the cost of violating the law, relative to not doing so, will be reduced. The 
result will be more violations of the law."). 
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under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Reform Act's 
pleading standard, plaintiffs must specify in their complaint each statement 
alleged to have been misleading and the reasons why the statement is 
misleading.52 In addition, if an "allegation is made on information and 
belief, the plaintiff shall state with particularity all facts on which the belief 
is formed."53 Finally, the pleading standard requires plaintiffs to state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant 
acted with "the required state of mind."54 By requiring plaintiffs to plead 
facts demonstrating scienter, the motion to dismiss becomes a substantive 
challenge to the merits of the lawsuit, a substantial departure from the 
"notice pleading" ordinarily required by the Federal Rules. The 
significance of this departure is enhanced by the fact that plaintiffs are left 
without the usual access to discovery to bolster their complaint. 
A. HISTORY OF THE PLEADING STANDARD 
Not surprisingly, the Reform Act's pleading standard was among the 
most contentious of the provisions debated by Congress. The pleading 
standard was intended to resolve a dispute that had arisen in the courts of 
appeals. While every federal appellate court that addressed the question 
has held that "recklessness" satisfies the scienter requirement for liability 
under Section lO(b) of the Exchange Act,55 they had differed on the 
question of what was required to plead an adequate complaint under that 
section. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
plaintiffs plead the circumstances giving rise to a claim of fraud "with 
particularity," but allows state of mind to be "averred generally."56 The 
Second Circuit held that pleading scienter under Section lO(b) requires 
"plaintiffs to allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent 
intent."57 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding the Second Circuit's 
interpretation inconsistent \vith the plain language of Rule 9(b). It instead 
52. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(l) (\Vest 1999). 
53. Id. 
54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1994). 
55. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane). 
The most commonly cited definition of recklessness is the one from Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical 
Corp.: 
[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable 
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents 
a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious 
that the actor must have been aware of it. 
553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 
719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)). 
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
57. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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held that plaintiffs could adequately plead a complaint "simply by saying 
that scienter existed."58 
The legislative history of the Reform Act is contradictory. At times it 
suggests Congress was trying to codify the Second Circuit standard, and at 
other times it suggests Congress was setting an even more rigorous 
standard.59 Most courts, including the Second and Third Circuits, have 
construed the Reform Act's pleading provision as adopting the Second 
Circuit's tests for satisfying the strong inference standard.60 Prior to 
passage of the Reform Act, the Second Circuit had held that its strong 
inference standard could be met by pleading facts that would satisfy either 
of the two tests. In the absence of direct evidence of the defendant's 
fraudulent intent, the plaintiff must allege either: (1) facts that constitute 
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless misbehavior, or (2) 
facts showing motive and opportunity to commit the fraud.61 Other courts, 
including the First, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, have rejected portions of 
the Second Circuit's approach. While not rejecting the circumstantial 
evidence of the recklessness test, these courts have held that motive and 
opportunity do not necessarily suffice to create the strong inference of 
scienter required by the Reform Act.62 These courts have held that motive 
and opportunity should be used only as factors to be considered in 
evaluating circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior or recklessness.63 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in Silicon Graphics, rejected both the motive and 
opportunity test and recklessness as bases for pleading scienter under the 
Reform Act. Instead the court required plaintiffs to plead that the 
defendants knew that the statements were false, or that the defendants were 
"consciously" or "deliberately" reckless in disregarding the truth or falsity 
of the statements. 64 
Congress clearly modeled the Reform Act's pleading standard on the 
demanding "strong inference" requirement of the Second Circuit. The 
Reform Act's "strong inference" standard for pleading scienter originated 
58. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 154I, I547 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
59. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The Refonn Act's 
legislative history on this point is ambiguous and even contradictory.''). 
60. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (dicta); lt1 re 
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999). 
61. See, e.g., Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128. 
62. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado 
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285-87 (11th Cir. 1999); Greebel v. FrP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 
196 (1st Cir. 1999). 
63. See, e.g., Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551. 
64. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). 
2000] SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS 787 
in Senate Bill 240, the Senate precursor to the Act. As reported by the 
Senate Banking Committee, Senate Bill 240 mandated that the complaint 
"specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind."65 When the Senate bill reached the 
floor, Senator Specter offered an amendment purporting to codify the tests 
used by the Second Circuit in applying the strong inference standard, which 
the Senate adopted.66 But Specter's amendment codifying these tests was 
deleted by the Conference Committee. 67 The Statement of Managers 
produced by the Conference Committee that reconciled the House and 
Senate versions of the Reform Act explained this decision: 
The Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading 
standard of the Second Circuit. The standard also is specifically written 
to conform the language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading with 
"particularity." 
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit 
requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and that 
these facts, in tum, must give rise to a "strong inference" of the 
defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the Conference Committee 
intends to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to 
codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading 
standard.68 
Thus, the Conference Committee made it clear that it was adopting the 
Second Circuit standard, at least "in part," but it did not want to incorporate 
the Second Circuit's cases applying that standard. A footnote appended to 
the above quoted portion of the Statement of Managers elaborated: "For 
this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading 
65. S. 240, 104th Cong. § 104 (1995). The Senate Banking Committee's report makes clear that 
Congress modeled the Act's pleading standard on the Second Circuit's: 
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would generate 
additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the 
pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, 
the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" 
of defendant's fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second 
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard, although courts may find this body of 
law instructive. 
S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
66. See 141 CONG. REC. S9200 (1995). 
67. The Conference Committee also changed the language of the standard from "specifically 
allege" to "plead with particularity" based on the recommendation of the Judicial Conferenee that the 
provision be amended to conform to Rule 9(b)'s particularity language. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9066-67 
(1995). This does not appear to have intended any substantive change. 
68. 141 CONG. REC. Hl3702 (1995). 
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standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or 
recklessness."69 
Congress' actions with regard to the pleading standard create two 
conflicting interpretive presumptions. First, absent contrary evidence, 
courts ordinarily presume Congress intended to adopt the settled judicial 
constructions of a rule when it incorporates that standard into a statute.70 
Because the settled judicial construction of the Second Circuit's pleading 
standard includes both the circumstantial evidence of scienter test and the 
motive and opportunity test, it could be assumed that Congress intended 
that courts would rely on those tests in interpreting the pleading standard of 
the Reform Act. The second presumption arises from the Conference 
Committee's deletion of the Specter amendment. When Congress 
expressly declines to adopt specific statutory language, "its action strongly 
militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it 
expressly declined to enact."71 Thus, this interpretive presumption 
suggests that the courts should not rely on the Second Circuit's tests. 
President Clinton cited the Statement of Managers as one of his 
reasons for vetoing the Reform Act. In his veto message, he stated: 
First, I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report 
with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable 
procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I 
am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading standard of any 
Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal clear in the 
Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond that 
level. I am not prepared to accept that. 
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and 
adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case 
law with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically 
indicated that they were not adopting Second Circuit case law but instead 
intended to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the 
Second Circuit. All this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher 
barrier to bringing suit than any now existing-one so high that even the 
69. 141 CONG. REC. H13705 n.23 (1995). 
70. See Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991) ("Because these 
decisions were part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress enacted [the statute] ... we 
may presume that Congress intended to codify these principles .... "); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 
581 (1978) ("[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, 
Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the 
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute."). 
71. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974). 
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most aggrieved investors with the most painful losses may get tossed out 
of court before they have a chance to prove their case.72 
789 
Given that Congress subsequently overrode the President's veto, the 
most obvious interpretation of its action would be that it favored the 
President's interpretation of the pleading standard. But in the floor debate 
following the President's veto, Senator Dodd and the other managers of the 
Reform Act distanced themselves from that interpretation. Senator Dodd 
argued the President had "reversed course on the pleading standards" 
which the President had previously endorsed.73 The Senator explained that 
the Conference Committee had omitted the Specter amendment because it 
"did not really follow the guidance of the second circuit."74 The pleading 
provision, contrary to the President's belief, "met [the Second Circuit] 
standard .... We have left out the guidance. That does not mean you 
disregard it."75 Senator Domenici reiterated that the Reform Act's pleading 
standard "is the Second Circuit's pleading standard" and was a 
"codification of the Second Circuit rule."76 Evidently rejecting President 
Clinton's arguments, Congress voted to override his veto.77 Given the 
remarks of the Reform Act's Managers urging an override of the veto, 
another interpretive presumption arises: The President's understanding of 
the Reform Act in his veto message should be ignored.78 
B. EFFECTS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PLEADING STANDARD ON 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 
The conflicting presumptions arising from the Reform Act's 
legislative history have led to interpretive confusion in the courts over how 
demanding the pleading standard should be.79 Courts reviewing that 
72. 141 CONG. REC. Hl5215 (1995). 
73. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9067 (1995). 
74. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (1995). 
75. Id. 
76. 141 CONG. REC. S19150 (1995). 
77. See 141 CONG. REC. H15224 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. Sl9180 (1995). 
78. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 235 (1978) (rejecting interpretation 
in Presidential veto message when supporters of the legislation disagreed with that interpretation of the 
bill during post-veto debate). 
79. The use of legislative history to interpret ambiguous statutes has both its defenders and its 
detractors. Compare Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992), and Patricia M. Wald, The Siu.ling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in 
Constrning Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 
(1990), with John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 
(1997), and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold 
Story ofHoly Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998). We take no position on this controversy; 
we simply note that judges are avid users of this interpretive resource. 
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legislative history can find support for each of the three interpretations that 
have been adopted. Quite arguably, each of the three interpretations can be 
considered "correct" based on traditional rules of statutory interpretation. 
We agree with the conclusion of the First Circuit: 
The legislative history is inconclusive on whether the [Reform] Act was 
meant to either embody or to reject the Second Circuit's pleading 
standards. . . . At best, there appears to have been an agreement to 
disagree on the issue of Second Circuit standards (other than the strong 
inference standard), and perhaps, as is common, to leave sueh matters for 
courts to resolve.80 
It is likely that the Supreme Court eventually will be obliged to grant 
certiorari to resolve the conflict. Congress did, after all, express its 
intention that pleading standards be uniform, even if it was less than clear 
on what that standard should be.81 
An ultimate decision by the Supreme Court will have significant 
policy consequences. If the Court adopts a strict interpretation of the 
pleading standard, fraud claims that are not plausible on the face of the 
complaint will be dismissed. If such an interpretation discouraged only 
meritless suits, it could reduce the enormous transaction costs imposed by 
those suits, thereby producing deterrence at a lower cost. On the other 
hand, if the bar for pleading an adequate complaint is set too high, it may 
screen out a large number of meritorious suits, as well as the frivolous, thus 
undermining deterrence. In the next Part, we attempt to shed some 
empirical light on how the Court should strike that balance. 
IV. DATA AND FINDINGS 
Event study methodology is a well-established means for measuring 
investors' perception of the effect of an economic event on shareholder 
wealth, and it is widely used in the context of the securities laws. Indeed, the 
event study methodology used here relies on the Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis-which is also the fundamental premise of the fraud on the 
market class action. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis postulates that 
stock prices rapidly incorporate publicly available information regarding the 
80. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999). 
81. The Reform Act's Statement of Managers explains Congress' concern that the pleading 
requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had "not prevented abuse of the 
securities laws by private litigants" and that the courts of appeals had "interpreted Rule 9(b)'s 
requirement in conflicting ways." 141 CONG. REC. Hl3702 (1995). The Statement of Managers also 
notes that Congressional hearings had "included testimony on the need to establish unifonn and more 
stringent pleading requirements." Id. That goal of unifonnity has not yet been achieved. 
2000] SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS 791 
value of those shares.82 In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,83 the Supreme Court 
endorsed the use of stock price effects to establish that the market relied on 
misstatements.84 Courts have also relied on the event study methodology 
employed here in other contexts concerning the federal securities laws, 
including the measurement of damages in open-market fraud cases85 and to 
demonstrate the materiality of misstatements. 86 
Those uses of event studies are distinguishable, however, from the use in 
this Article in that they help resolve evidentiary questions arising from the 
application of the law to the facts of a given case. But event studies have also 
been used to assess corporate law decisions by Delaware courts.87 Related 
studies attempt to measure the value of incorporating in Delaware.88 In 
addition, studies have assessed the shareholder wealth effects of state anti-
takeover legislation.89 We use the same methodology to test the effect of the 
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Reform Act in Silicon Graphics. 
In an earlier study, two of us found that the passage of the Reform Act 
produced positive abnormal stock returns, on average, for shareholders of a 
sample of high technology companies.90 The market reaction was most 
positive for firms with a high overall probability of being sued in a securities 
class action. For those firms that had the highest risk of fraudulent financial 
82. See JAMES LORIE, PETER DODD & MARY KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND 
EVIDENCE 55-75 (2d ed. 1985) (describing empirical evidence supporting the Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis). 
83. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
84. Id. at 246 ("Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market 
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any 
material misrepresentations."). 
85. See Janet Cooper Alexander, 17ze Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1421, 1428-62 (1994) (discussing courts' reliance on stock price events studies in measuring damages); 
Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Moigan, Using Finance 17zeory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the 
Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REY. 883 (1990). 
86. See Mruk L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, 17ze Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud 
Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545 (1994). 
87. See Sreenivas Kamma, Joseph Weintrop & Peggy Wier, Investors' Perceptions of the Delaware 
Supreme Court Decision in Unocal v. Mesa, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 419 (1988). See also Weiss & White, supra 
note 14. 
88. See Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The Recent 
Experience, 18 J. FIN. MGMT. Ass'N 29 (1989); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate 
Cluirters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980). See also Robert 
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Finn Value? (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) 
(using cross-sectional study to assess marginal value of Delaware corporate law). 
89. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State 
Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. EcoN. 291 (1989). See also Romano, supra note 14. 
90. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 
Private Securities litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 REY. ACCT. STUD. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript on 
file with authors). 
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reporting practices, however, shareholder returns were significantly lower. 
Nonetheless, on balance the market appears to have expected that the benefits 
of discouraging weak lawsuits would be greater than the costs of reduced 
deterrence. 
That study did not allow for examination of the wealth effects from 
particular provisions of the Reform Act. Consequently, it cannot be 
determined from that evidence whether investors considered the heightened 
pleading standard to be wealth-enhancing. It is possible that certain 
provisions of the Reform Act, such as the discovery stay and the safe harbor 
for forward-looking statements were wealth-enhancing, while the pleading 
standard was wealth-diminishing. The Silicon Graphics decision provides an 
opportuuity to focus on the effects of the Reform Act's pleading standard. 
A. THE SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
To test the effects of the Silicon Graphics decision on shareholder 
wealth, we select a sample of firms that historically have been vulnerable to 
class action securities litigation. These firms are therefore the ones most 
likely to be affected by the interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading 
standard. Compared to firms in other industries, high technology companies 
are involved in a disproportionately large number of securities lawsuits.91 We 
use companies from three high technology industries-pharmaceuticals, 
computer hardware, and computer software.92 Our initial sample consists of 
311 public companies used in the event study discussed previously with stock 
return data available to conduct our tests. We exclude thirty-two of these 
firms with class actions pending at the time of the Silicon Graphics decision, 
as the stock price reaction for these firms was likely to be dominated by the 
reduced probability of liability in the pending suit. Additionally, we exclude 
two firms that made public announcements of important corporate events on 
the day of or the first trading day following the decision. Our final sample 
thus includes 277 firms, ninety-three with headquarters located in the Ninth 
Circuit and 184 with headquarters outside the Ninth Circuit. 
91. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's 
Experience (Feb. 1997) (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School Working 
Paper No. 140); Christopher L. Jones & Seth E. Weingrarn, Why lOb-5 Litigation Risk ls Higher for 
Technology and Financial Services Finns (July 1996) (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, 
Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 112). 
92. We use Standard Industrial Classification (the "SIC") codes to identify finns in these 
industries-pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833-2836), computer hardware (SIC codes 3570-3577) and 
computer software (SIC codes 7371-7379). 
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The Ninth Circuit handed down its Silicon Graphics decision on the 
morning of July 2, 1999.93 That same morning, the decision was posted on 
the court's web site, and the clerk's office notified by telephone the lawyers 
for the parties to the appeal. The lawyers notified their clients and interested 
journalists that day.94 The decision also was announced at a securities 
litigation conference in Colorado that afternoon.95 Later that evening, the 
Associated Press ran the story on its newswire at 6:53 P.M.96 The AP story is 
the first news account of the decision that we have found. Stories reporting 
the decision ran in three major California papers-the San Jose Mercury 
News, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Los Angeles Times-on July 3, 
1999, a Saturday.97 Because the following Monday-July 5-was a holiday, 
the story did not run in the Wall Street Journal until July 6.98 Given court 
rules regarding confidentiality, we assume that the news of the decision was 
not available to traders before July 2. Additionally, we conclude from the 
widespread media coverage that virtually any securities analyst following 
companies in the three high technology industries we examine was likely to 
be aware of the decision on July 6. Accordingly, we examine stock return 
data from July 2 through July 6, which includes only two trading days, the 
second and the sixth. 
The event study methodology requires a measure of abnormal returns. 
The abnormal return is the actual stock return over the event period minus the 
return expected if the event did not take place. The expected return is 
obtained by estimating the relation between a given security's return and the 
market return for a period prior to the event in question. This relation 
93. A revised version of the decision was handed down by the court on August 4, 1999. Although the 
amended opinion softened some of the language used in the opinion, the requirement that plaintiffs plead 
"deliberate" recklessness to state a claim for securities fraud was not changed. See Antifraud: Ninth Circuit 
Amends Ruling on Reform Act Pleading Standard, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1140 (Aug. 27, 1999). 
The private plaintiffs and the SEC renewed their request for review of the decision by the full court after the 
amended opinion was handed down. See id. We therefore did not collect stock price returns from August 4. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane on October 27, 
1999. The plaintiffs did not petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. 
94. Telephone Interview with Jerome Bim, counsel for Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Aug. 1999). 
95. Telephone Interview with David Levine, attendee at National Economic Research Associates 
Finance, Law & Economies Securities Litigation Seminar, June 30-July 2, 1999, Keystone, Colo. (Aug. 
1999). 
96. See Bob Egelko, Court Tightens Standard for Securities Fraud Suits, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRES, July 2, 1999, at 18:53:00, available in Westlaw ALLNEWSPLUS library. 
97. See Howard Mintz, Federal Court Makes Securities Fraud Lawsuits More Difficult, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, July 3, 1999, available in 1999WL17354957; Reynolds Holding, Court Piiis limits on 
Securities Fraud Suits, S.F. CHRON., July 3, 1999, at Al; David Maharaj & Herny Weinstein, Ruling 
Tightens Standard in Investors' Fraud Suits, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1999, at Cl. 
98. See Scott Thurm, Appeals Court Sets High Standards For Shareholders i11 Stock-Fraud Suits, 
WALL ST. J.,July 6, 1999, atA23. 
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provides a benchmark for determining the expected return of a firm's stock 
during the event period, given the market return. We calculated the abnormal 
return for each firm in the sample for the two trading days indicated above, 
and added these daily abnormal returns to obtain cumulative abnormal returns 
(the "CARs") for the event period for each firm. The overall CAR is an 
average of the individual firm CARs. If investors viewed the Silicon 
Graphics decision as beneficial to their interests, we would expect to observe 
a positive average CAR. Conversely, if investors believed that the decision 
harmed their interests, we would expect a negative average CAR. 
More volatile firms are apt to have a larger absolute return on the event 
date, even if the value of the firm is unaffected by the event being studied. 
Therefore, the significance of the CARs is determined by constructing a Z-
statistic that weights each individual firm's abnormal returns by the inverse of 
the standard deviation of the returns, thereby giviug greater weight to the 
CARs of the less volatile firms.99 
B. RESULTS 
We find that there was a significant positive market reaction to the 
Silicon Graphics decision, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
investors believed that the Ninth Circuit's stringent interpretation of the 
Reform Act's pleading standard, on average, enhanced shareholder wealth. 
As the graph below indicates, there was a cumulative positive mean abnormal 
return of 1.78% over the two days following announcement of the decision. 
This result is statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence, meaning 
that there is less than a 1 % chance that the result would occur purely by 
chance. 
The graph also compares the average CAR of firms headquartered in the 
Ninth Circuit to that of firms with headquarters in other Circuits. These 
results provide an even more striking picture of the impact of the Silicon 
Graphics decision on shareholder wealth. The average CAR for those firms 
most directly affected by the decision-the Ninth Circuit firms-is 2.79%, 
compared to only 1.27% for the other firms in the sample. Both of these 
results are significant at the 99% level of confidence. It is not surprising that 
the non-Ninth Circuit firms should have a positive price reaction-before the 
Ninth Circuit ruling, no appellate court had accepted the stringent "deliberate 
recklessness" standard.100 The Ninth Circuit's decision made it more likely 
that other appellate courts, and more importantly, the Supreme Court might 
99. Details of the procedure and statistical tests are provided in the Appendix. 
100. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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accept the stringent standard. Nonetheless, the decision has its greatest effect 
on Ninth Circuit companies, and the Ninth Circuit average CAR is 
significantly greater than the non-Ninth Circuit average CAR at the 95% level 
of confidence. Overall, then, the results support the proposition that investors 









All Firms Ninth Circuit Other Circuits 
MARKET REACTION TO THE SILICON GRAPIDCS DECISION 
To put these results in more concrete terms, the average change in 
market value for our sample companies was $12,429,000.101 Once again, the 
increase was substantially greater for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit, 
despite the fact that these firms were considerably smaller, on average, than 
the non-Ninth Circuit firms. 102 The average change in market value for Ninth 
Circuit firms was $18,459,000, compared to $9,381,000 for the non-Ninth 
Circuit firms in our sample. Thus, the Silicon Graphics decision had a 
substantial impact, whether measured in percentage of value or dollar terms. 
If investors believed that the high pleading standard adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit would benefit shareholders by reducing the net cost of securities 
litigation, as the above results suggest, then it should also be the case that 
firms at greatest risk of being sued would benefit more than other firms. To 
explore this possibility, we compare the market reaction to the Silicon 
101. We calculated the change in market value by multiplying the cumulative abnonnal return by 
the market value of the finn as of June 30, 1999 (just prior to the announcement of the decision). 
102. The mean market values were $2 billion for the firms in the Ninth Circuit and $3.4 billion for 
the non-Ninth Circuit firms. 
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Graphics decision of firms with a relatively high probability of being sued to 
the reaction of firms with a relatively low probability of being sued. We use 
the following company characteristics as predictors for the filing of a 
securities fraud lawsuit:103 
(I) Stock Price Volatility. Because securities class actions are often filed 
when there is a large stock price decline, it is sometimes argued that 
these lawsuits are related to the volatility of the firm's stock price. The 
more volatile the stock, the more likely a large stock price decline that 
will trigger the filing of a lawsuit. 
(2) Stock Price Peiformance. Firms that have been performing poorly 
are more likely to experience a stock price decline that will trigger a 
lawsuit. 
(3) CEO Power. Concentration of power in the hands of the Chief 
Executive Officer of the company provides both the incentive and the 
opportunity to engage in fraudulent activity. 
(4) Monitoring. Fraudulent activity is more likely to occur when there 
are weaknesses in the oversight of management by the board of directors 
or outside auditors. 
(5) External Financing. Firms have an incentive to fraudulently 
manipulate investors' perceptions of firm value to obtain external 
financing on more favorable terms, so fraud is more likely in periods 
when the firm is issuing securities. 
(6) Leverage. Firms with heavy debt loads relative to equity have an 
incentive to engage in fraud to avoid violation of debt covenants and 
default. 
We estimate the relation between these six firm characteristics and 
whether or not a firm was actually sued in the two years prior to the 
passage of the Reform Act to determine the litigation risk of each of the 
firms in our sample. We find that the probability of a lawsuit ranges from 
3% to 83% in our sample, with an average probability of 27% over the two-
year period. Therefore, securities lawsuits are fairly frequent occurrences 
for these firms, as expected. We use these estimated probabilities as a 
proxy for firms' litigation risk.104 
We partition the sample firms into four portfolios based on the 
probability that they will be sued. As we expected, the average abnormal 
103. See Jones & Weingram, supra note 91; Jennifer Francis, Donna Philbrick & Katherine 
Schipper, Detenninants and Outcomes in Class Action Securities Litigation (1994) (Working Paper, 
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago); Patricia M. Dechow et al., supra note 25. 
I 04. The Appendix discusses the measurement of these variables and the procedure used to estimate 
the probability of being sued. 
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return is more positive for firms at greater risk of being sued in a securities 
class action. The graph below reveals that the average CAR for firms with the 
highest litigation risk was 2.61 %, which is statistically significant at the 99% 
level of confidence. In contrast, the average market reaction for firms with 










Lowest Risk Highest Risk 
THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION RISK ON THE MARKET 
REACTION 
Although the average CAR for the sample of high litigation risk firms is 
more than twice that of the low risk sample, the difference is only significant 
at the 90% level of confidence. It may seem somewhat surprising that 
investors did not perceive that the Silicon Graphics decision would enhance 
wealth for shareholders of firms at high risk of litigation significantly more 
than that for shareholders of firms with relatively low risk of litigation, 
especially because the Silicon Graphics interpretation discourages litigation. 
This result is particularly surprising in light of the fact that litigation risk 
appears to vary substantially across our sample. One possible explanation for 
this lack of a statistically significant difference is that our measure of litigation 
risk does not adequately capture firms' exposure to litigation. Although we 
cannot rule out this possibility, another explanation deserves investigation. 
Specifically, if investors distinguish between firms that are likely to be the 
subject of a weak or frivolous lawsuit and those that are likely to be sued for 
substantial fraud, our measure of overall litigation risk may mask the market's 
reaction. Our measure contains components that are likely to correlate with 
both nonmeritorious and meritorious lawsuits. If investors can distingnish 
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between the two, the nonmeritorious and meritorious components may be 
partially canceling each other out. 
A review of the six characteristics that affect firms' susceptibility to 
litigation suggests, all else equal, that the first two factors indicate a "strike 
suit," whereas the last four factors are plausibly associated with the merits of 
the plaintiffs' claims. Firms with minimal risk of a lawsuit due to fraudulent 
activity stand to benefit the most from the Ninth Circuit's stringent 
interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard, while those with a high 
risk of being sued for committing fraud will benefit the least, if at all. 
Obviously, deterrence is most valuable for those firms most likely to engage 
in fraud, and the stringent Silicon Graphics standard is likely to reduce 
deterrence by making it more difficult to bring suit. The findings reported in 
the next graph support this contention. The average CAR for firms with 
relatively little risk of litigation due to fraudulent activity is 2.71 %-
significant at the 99% level of confidence-while that for firms with a high 
probability of being sued for fraudulent activity is only 0.96o/o-which is 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, the average CAR for the lowest risk 
portfolio is significantly greater than that of the highest risk portfolio at the 
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I• Risk of Fraud D Other Risk I 
THE EFFECTS OF COMPONENTS OF LITIGATION RISK ON 
THE MARKET REACTION 
We expect to find the opposite pattern for firms whose litigation risk is 
attributable to factors other than fraud. Firms at greatest risk of strike suits 
stand to benefit the most from the high pleading standard adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit. Although this is the same basic prediction we tested in the 
graph above when partitioning the sample by litigation risk, the results are 
much more striking when we remove the confounding effects of investors' 
reaction to the possibility of genuine fraud. The 2.68% average CAR for the 
portfolio of firms with the highest litigation risk is statistically significant at 
the 99% level of confidence.105 This compares to an insignificant mean return 
of 0.51 % for the portfolio of firms with the lowest litigation risk. The 
difference in returns is significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
In sum, we find that the Silicon Graphics decision produced a 
statistically significant, positive abnormal return for our sample of high 
technology companies. The result was more positive for firms headquartered 
in the Ninth Circuit (and therefore the firms most directly affected by the 
l 05. Several readeis of prior drafts suggested that the overall positive stock price reaction might be the 
result of establishing the legal standard and thereby reducing unpredictability. We think that is unlikely 
given the unpredictability of the competing interpretations of the Reform Act's pleading standard. Simply 
deciding what the rule will be does not increase predictability if the rule chosen is itself unpredictable. The 
strong price reaction for firms at the highest risk of litigation suggests that the response is produced by lower 
expected litigation costs, that is, the "deliberate recklessness" standard reduces the likelihood of suit and the 
expected cost of settlement 
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decision), but results were positive and statistically significant for non-Ninth 
Circuit firms as well. When we divided our sample on the basis of the firms' 
risk of securities litigation, we found that the abnormal returns were positively 
related to the firms' likelihood of being sued. However, the difference _, 
between the high litigation risk quartile and low risk quartile was not 
significant at conventional significance levels. Finally, when we partitioned 
our probability of litigation into factors related to meritorious plaintiffs' 
claims and nonmeritorious factors, we found that the price reaction was 
positively correlated with the nonmeritorious factors, but was negatively 
related to the factors that indicated the possibility of fraud. These latter results 
strongly support the view that the Ninth Circuit's decision drove the positive 
stock price reaction for the overall sample, rather than some independent 
cause. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE USE OF EVENT STUDIES IN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
How should courts interpret ambiguous statutes? A variety of answers 
to this question have been offered, with the range seemingly limited only 
by the imagination of law professors.106 For those more focused on the real 
world, however, Jane Schacter argnes that the actual practice of the 
Supreme Court reflects a "common law originalism."107 In her view, the 
Court's approach is '"originalist' in that it uses statutory language as an 
interpretive anchor and focal point," but it also reflects "the common law 
form because it draws from an array of judicially-created sources to 
delineate the ranges of plausible textual meanings and then to select from 
among them."108 Among these sources are a variety of policy norms such 
as federalism. These norms provide "value-laden interpretive baselines 
106. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 273-76 (advocating the "imaginative reconstruction" of the 
enacting legislature); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE (1990) (advocating interpretation based on substantive canons intended to enhance 
the working of the regulatory state); Ronald Dworkin, lAw as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 531 
(1982) (advocating the interpretation of a statute "to show it as the best work of art it can be ••.• "); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stat11tes' Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (advocating the interpretation 
of only detailed statutes according to the intention of purehasers); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic 
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (advocating interpretation that gives statutes 
coherence and relevance for contemporary problems); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting P11blic-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
223 ( 1986) (advocating interpretation that mitigates the excesses of interest-group legislation). 
107. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common lAw Originalism in Recent Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the.Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
I, 5 (1998). 
108. Id. (emphasis added). 
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against which the meaning of the disputed language is measured and 
assessed."109 Reliance on these policy norms affords judges a substantial 
role in determining the content of legal rules.110 
It is not our purpose in this Article to assess whether judges should 
rely on such contestable policy norms when interpreting statutes. Instead, 
our proposal is more modest: If judges are going to rely on policy norms 
when faced with statutory ambiguity, the appropriate baseline norm for 
interpreting the Reform Act should be shareholder wealth maximization. 
We reach that conclusion for two reasons. First, we believe that norm best 
reflects Congress' purposes in adopting the Reform Act. Second, 
shareholder wealth maximization is the background norm that best serves 
the interests of the parties governed by the securities laws. 
Courts have not, to date, used event studies of shareholder wealth 
effects as a guide to the interpretation of the federal securities laws-that 
is, they have not relied upon shareholder wealth maximization in 
determining the substance of the law .111 One obvious obstacle to the use of 
shareholder wealth maximization as an interpretive tool is the Supreme 
Court's decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson defining the scope of the 
securities laws' antifraud prohibitions. 112 In that case, the Court clearly 
rejected investor wealth in favor of investor protection, suggesting that it 
was for Congress, not the courts, to implement such a shift in the focus of 
the securities laws. 113 
But this decision predates Congress' enactment of the Reform Act, 
which may represent just such a shift. Congress' purposes in adopting the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act make shareholder wealth 
maximization a more appropriate reading of congressional intent in this 
context. According to the Statement of Managers that accompanied the 
109. Id. at 24. 
110. See id. at 25. 
111. Event studies have, however, been used to resolve evidentiary questions. See supra text 
accompanying notes 86-88. 
112. 485 U.S. 224, 235 (1988): 
[O]ne Court of Appeals has stated that "silence pending settlement of the price and structure 
of a deal is beneficial to most investors, most of the time". We need not ascertain, however, 
whether secrecy necessarily maximizes shareholder wealth-although we note that the 
proposition is at least disputed as a matter of theory and empirical research-for this case 
does not concern the timing of a disclosure; it concerns only its accuracy and completeness. 
We face here the narrow question whether information concerning the existence and status of 
preliminary merger discussions is significant to the reasonable investor's trading decision. 
Arguments based on the premise that some disclosure would be "premature" in a sense are 
more properly considered under the rubric of an issuer's duty to disclose. The "secrecy" 
rationale is simply inapposite to the definition of materiality. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
113. See id. 
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final version of the Reform Act, the Act was designed to achieve a balance 
between investor protection and the deterrence of frivolous suits. Congress 
claimed that it was seeking to protect the welfare of investors in striking 
this balance: 
The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect 
investors and to maintain confidence in the securities markets, so that our 
national savings, capital formation and investment may grow for the 
benefit of all Americans . 
. . . Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which 
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon 
government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global 
confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to 
guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others 
properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks to return the securities 
litigation system to that high standard. 
. . . When an issuer must pay lawyers' fees, make settlement 
payments, and expend management and employee resources in 
defending a meritless suit, the issuers' own investors suffer. Investors 
always are the ultimate losers when extortionate "settlements" are 
extracted from issuers. 
This Conference Report seeks to protect investors, issuers, and all 
who are associated with our capital markets from abusive securities 
litigation. This legislation implements needed procedural protections to 
discourage frivolous litigation.114 
This passage supports the view that Congress was seeking to 
maximize shareholder wealth when it adopted the Reform Act's pleading 
standard. Congress clearly recognized that securities fraud class actions 
have costs as well as benefits and expressed its intention to balance those 
costs and benefits for the benefit of shareholders. 
Further evidence of Congress' preference for the consideration of 
economic efficiency in interpreting the securities laws can be found in the 
National Securities Market Improvement Act (the "NSMIA"). Passed in 
1996, NSMIA directs the SEC to "consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation',' when it is engaged in rulemaking.115 While this law is 
directed toward the SEC, not the courts, it does suggest a change in 
114. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at31-32 (1995). 
115. 15 U.S.C.A. §78(c)(f) (West 1999). 
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Congress' attitude toward the securities laws from the paternalistic attitude 
of the 1930s. It seems unlikely that today's Congress would want courts to 
ignore efficiency concerns in interpreting the Reform Act, even if the text 
of the statute does not specify that goal as NSMIA does. 
In addition to reflecting congressional intent, shareholder wealth 
maximization provides a normatively justifiable basis for balancing the 
costs and benefits of securities fraud class actions. Shareholders 
presumably invest in securities in an effort to maximize their wealth, and, 
therefore, they prefer governing rules tailored to that purpose.116 To be 
sure, our study's results do not establish that the Silicon Graphics 
interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard benefits all 
corporations. Our sample consists of only high technology companies, and 
our results would not necessarily extend to other industry sectors. 
Additionally, for those companies that were most likely to commit fraud, 
the abnormal returns were statistically indistinguishable from zero, but 
notably were not negative. For the shareholders of some companies, 
raising the bar for securities fraud class actions may be neither wealth-
enhancing nor wealth-diminishing. The result for the firms most likely to 
commit fraud suggests another policy prescription that might be drawn 
from our study: Abolishing the fraud on the market class action 
altogether117 might well impose such a significant loss of deterrence that it 
would produce a negative stock price reaction. 
Our results do, however, provide evidence that market participants 
believe that the hurdle imposed to securities fraud class actions created by 
the Silicon Graphics rule is likely to enhance wealth on average-the price 
reaction was positive for the sample as a whole. While these market 
participants may be wrong in their assessment of the effects of the Silicon 
Graphics decision, investors have powerful incentives to value these 
effects correctly .118 Because the stock price effect was positive even for 
firms that are unlikely to face litigation, it seems probable that companies 
operating in sectors where securities fraud litigation is less common would 
not experience negative stock returns from the decision. Thus, 
shareholders on average are likely to benefit from the Ninth Circuit's 
116. See Romano, supra note 14, at 113 (describing "the maximization of equity share prices" as 
"the core goal of corporation law"). 
117. The House proposed to do just that in the original version of the bill that became the Refonn 
Act. See H.R. 10, l04th Cong., Title I, §204 (1995). 
118. Courts are certainly in no better position to evaluate the effect of the standard, and their 
incentives to be correct are not as stroug as the market participants. For a critique of the use of market 
responses to evaluate judicial decisions, see Merritt B. Fox, The Role of the Market Model in Corporate 
Analysis: A Comment on Weiss and White, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1015 (1988). 
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interpretation. And most shareholders are likely to be average shareholders 
because they hold a reasonably diverse portfolio, either by purchasing a 
number of different stocks or by purchasing automatic diversification 
through a mutual fund. 
In a world where most shareholders hold diversified portfolios, 
policymakers designing rules for shareholders' benefit will succeed if the 
rules adopted are beneficial on average. Other stakeholders in the 
corporate enterprise-managers, employees, creditors-presumably benefit 
from rules that maximize shareholder wealth as well because such rules 
reduce the corporation's cost of capital, thereby giving the corporation 
greater resources with which to compensate its managers and employees 
and greater ability to repay its debts.119 
In passing the Reform Act, Congress sought to maintain investor 
protection while minimizing the costs imposed by securities fraud class 
actions. Any interpretation of the Reform Act's pleading standard 
necessarily entails a trade-off between those two goals. The tools of 
statutory interpretation most frequently relied upon by courts-text and 
legislative history-do little in this context to tell us where that balance 
should be struck. Congress studiously avoided resolving the question in 
the text of the statute, and the legislative history is hopelessly conflicted. 
The Supreme Court will have to look elsewhere when it eventually resolves 
the dispute over the proper interpretation of the pleading standard. The 
empirical evidence presented in this Article suggests that the Silicon 
Graphics interpretation of the pleading standard enhances shareholder 
wealth. In the absence of a more compelling basis for picking among the 
competing interpretations, we believe that evidence provides a strong basis 
for the Supreme Court to accept the stringent interpretation adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics. 
119. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 38. 
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APPENDIX 
We measure the impact of the Ninth Circuit decision on our sample 
firms by calculating the abnormal stock return on July 2, the date on which 
the Ninth Circuit released its decision, and July 6, the first trading day 
following the decision and the date on which coverage of the decision 
appeared in the Wall Street Journal. We estimate the expected return using 
the market model: 
where R;, is the rate of return on stock i during day t, Rm, is the rate of return 
on the market portfolio during day t, ~' and /31, are the parameters of the 
model, and E;, is the error or disturbance term. 
Daily stock returns and market returns for estimating the market 
model were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
("CRSP") daily returns file. We use the S&P 500 market index as our 
market index, although we obtain qualitatively similar inferences if we use 
any of the following alternative market indices: (1) S&P Small Cap, 
(2) NASDAQ, (3) Value Line, and (4) Wilshire 5000. The estimated 
market model parameters, ai and pi ' are obtained from an ordinary least 
squares regression of the market model over the 252 trading days of 
calendar year 1998. The expected return is subtracted from the actual 
return to obtain abnormal returns, ARil: 
We sum the daily abnormal returns over the two day event period to 
obtain cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(t1,t2): 
CAR <J1,t2)= t~t 
t=t1 
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We test the statistical significance of the abnormal returns using the 
following Z-statistic:120 
where n is the number of observations in the sample, and the variance of 
the cumulative abnormal return is defined as follows: 
2 
In this equation, V; is the residual variance from firm i's market 
model regression, T is the number of days in the event period, ED is the 
number of trading days in the estimation period, and Rm is the mean of 
the market returns over the estimation period. 
The following table reports the distribution of CARs for the full 
sample of firms, and for the sample partitioned by the location of the 
company's headquarters. We also report Z-statistics testing whether the 
mean CAR is significantly positive (Zµ>0) and whether the percentage of 
CARs that are positive is significantly greater than fifty percent (Z%>So%)· 
The results reported in this table correspond to those presented in the first 
graph in the Article. 
120. See Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Withdrawn Security Offerings, 23 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVEANALYSIS I 19, 132-33 (1988). 
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MARKET REACTION TO THE SILICON GRAPHICS DECISION 
All Firms Ninth Circuit Other Circuits 
(N= 2771 (N= 931 (N = 1841 
Mean 1.78 2.79 1.27 
Standard deviation 6.88 6.08 7.21 
25th percentile -1.35 -1.12 -1.44 
Median 1.26 1.86 1.10 
75th percentile 4.35 5.87 3.57 
% positive 63.18 63.44 63.04 
Zµ>0 4.88** 3.96** 3.17** 
z%>so% 4.39** 2.59** 3.54** 
* indicates significance at or above the 95% level of confidence. 
** indicates significance at or above the 99% level of confidence. 
To determine whether the market reaction was more positive for firms 
at greatest risk of being sued, we identified six characteristics that affect 
firms' susceptibility to litigation. The first two characteristics-Stock 
Price Volatility and Stock Price Peiformance-we obtained from a factor 
analysis of the following five variables: (1) market capitalization, (2) equity 
beta, (3) share turnover, (4) prior cumulative returns, and (5) return 
skewness. Factor analysis produces summary measures reflecting the 
common correlation among the proxies while minimizing the correlation 
among the constructed factor variables. The factor analysis yields the 
following summary measures: Volatility (positively correlated with equity 
beta and share turnover) and Peiformance (positively correlated with prior 
cumulative returns and return skewness). 
We obtained the two corporate governance characteristics-CEO 
Power and Monitoring-from a factor analysis of the following seven 
variables which we hand-collected from firms' proxy statements: (1) the 
proportion of insiders on the Board of Directors, (2) the proportion of 
common shares held by outside directors, (3) the presence of an audit 
committee, (4) the use of a Big Six auditor, (5) the presence of an outside 
blockholder, (6) the presence of a CEO who is also Chairman of the Board 
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of Directors, and (7) the presence of a CEO who is also the founder of the 
company. The first factor, CEO Power, is positively correlated with the 
presence of a CEO who is Chairman of the Board and a CEO who is also 
the company's founder, while the second factor, Monitoring, is positively 
correlated with the existence of an audit committee, the use of a Big Six 
auditor, and the presence of an outside blockholder. 
Finally, External Financing is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm issued either debt or equity during the two-year period preceding the 
passage of the Act, and zero otherwise, and Leverage is equal to the 
debt/equity ratio. We estimate the probability that each of the firms in our 
sample will be sued using the following probit model: 
Prob (litigatiollt = 1) = F( £11> + /31 Volatility; + /32Peifonnance; + /33CEO Power; 
+ /34Monitoring; + /35Financing; + /36Leverage; ) 
where Litigation is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was a 
defendant in a class action securities lawsuit, as reported in the Securities 
Class Action Alert, and zero otherwise. 
The following table reports the distribution of CARs for the sample 
partitioned into quartiles based on the estimated risk of litigation. The 
results reported in this table correspond to those presented in the second 
graph in the Article.121 
121. We obtain similar inferences using a weighted portfolio regression approach, where the 
portfolio weight is the firm-specific probability of litigation. See Stephan E. Sefcik & Rex Thompson, 
An Approach to Statistical Inference in Cross-Sectional Models with Security Abnormal Retums as 
Dependent Variable, 24 J. Acer. REs. 316, 334 (1986). 
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THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION RISK ON THE MARKET REACTION 
Litigation Risk Quartiles 
Lowest Risk 2 3 Hig_hest Risk 
Mean 1.19 1.79 1.52 2.61 
Standard deviation 7.37 5.15 8.61 5.92 
25th percentile -2.18 -1.25' -1.19 -0.57 
Median 0.63 1.29 1.38 1.46 
75th percentile 4.06 3.95 3.83 5.43 
% positive 52.17 65.21 68.12 68.12 
Zµ>0 1.63 2.52** 2.50** 3.09** 
z%>50% 0.36 2.53** 3.01** 3.01* 
* indicates significance at or above the 95% level of confidence. 
** indicates significance at or above the 99% level of confidence. 
To determine the component of total litigation risk attributable to the 
probability that a firm will be sued for fraud, we reestimate the previous 
model excluding the four fraud risk proxies, CEO Power, Monitoring, 
Financing and Leverage. We then compute the difference between the 
total probability of litigation obtained from the estimation of the full model, 
and the probability of litigation obtained from the modified model. This 
difference reflects the incremental contribution of fraud risk to firms' total 
litigation risk. 
The following table reports the distribution of CARs separately for the 
sample partitioned into quartiles based on the estimated risk of litigation 
due to fraud and the estimated risk of litigation attributable to other 
sources. The results reported in this table correspond to those presented in 
the third graph in the Article.122 
122. We obtain similar inferences using the weighted portfolio approach discussed supra note 
118. 
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Fraud Risk Quartiles 
Lowest Risk 2 3 Highest Risk 
Mean 2.71 1.58 1.86 0.96 
Standard deviation 7.08 5.44 6.51 8.21 
25th percentile -1.19 -1.87 -1.23 -0.80 
Median 1.66 1.26 1.27 0.70 
75th percentile 5.83 4.35 3.94 2.78 
% positive 63.77 60.87 68.12 60.87 
Zµ>() 4.00** 2.06* 1.98* 1.63 
z%>50% 2.29* 1.81* 3.01** 1.81* 
Other Risk Quartiles 
Lowest Risk 2 3 Highest Risk 
Mean 0.51 1.82 2.12 2.68 
Standard deviation 9.34 5.71 5.80 5.87 
25th percentile -3.27 -1.24 -0.69 -0.60 
Median 0.18 1.52 0.72 1.17 
75th percentile 3.17 4.41 4.50 4.18 
% positive 50.00 66.67 57.14 66.67 
Zµ>() 1.20 2.90** 2.59** 3.09** 
z%>50% 0.00 2.77** 1.32 2.77** 
* indicates significance at or above the 95% level of confidence. 
** indicates significance at or above the 99% level of confidence. 
